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MANAGEMENT:  
THESIS, ANTITHESIS, SYNTHESIS 
Abstract 
Increasingly, managers live in a world of paradox. For instance, they are told that they 
must manage by surrendering control and that they must stay on top by continuing to 
learn, thus admitting that they do not fully know what they do. Paradox is becoming 
increasingly pervasive in and around organizations, increasing the need for an 
approach to management that allows both researchers and practitioners to address 
these paradoxes. A synthesis is required between such contradictory forces as 
efficiency and effectiveness, planning and action, and structure and freedom. A 
dialectical view of strategy and organizations, built from four identifiable principles 
of simultaneity, locality, minimality and generality, enables us to build the tools to 
achieve such synthesis. Put together, these principles offer new perspectives for 
researchers to look at management phenomena and provide practitioners with a means 
of addressing the increasingly paradoxical world that they confront.  
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Introduction 
Few words appear more often in the recent literature on management than ‘paradox’. 
In the popular business press, managers are alerted to the emergent trends of the “age 
of paradox” (Handy, 1995). That Master of Paradox, Tom Peters (1987: 391-397), 
tells them to “master paradox”. Peters – probably the most well-known business 
‘guru’ – when asked what would be the most important lesson he would like to teach 
humanity, answered as follows: “success is the result of deep grooves, but deep 
grooves destroy adaptability [which is the touchstone of success].” In this he 
identifies the “great paradox” (Peters, 1992: 616).  
Although explicit recognition is recent, in the academic literature on 
management and organizations, paradox can be traced back at least as far as Adam 
Smith’s  ‘pin factory’, where integration and differentiation surfaced as the major 
tensions underlying the rise of the modern industrial organization (Smith, 1776/1991). 
The paradox was that master craftsmen were less efficient and effective at producing 
pins than were simple hired hands. Paradoxically, ingenuity and dexterity were 
antithetical rather than related. Work had to be precisely prescribed (or de-skilled) to 
produce the most efficient results – an insight that survived right through early 
twentieth century Taylorism up to the more recent Quality movement. More recently 
scholars have identified similar paradoxes in diverse areas of organization theory 
(Weick, 1993a; Hatch, 1999), including specific applications concerning time and 
organization (Burrell, 1992), organizational change (Orlikowski & Hofman, 1997; 
Edelman & Benning, 1998), organizational culture (Machin & Carrithers, 1996), 
leadership (Thayer, 1988) and communication (Yates & Orlikowski, 1999). 
In this light, paradox is not really new to either management researchers or 
practitioners. From scientific management onward (Taylor, 1947) the attempts to 
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tackle paradox fall mainly into two approaches. These have succeeded each other 
historically and can now be said to co-exist. First, scholars attempted to find the ‘best 
way’ to come to grips with central tensions. For as long as most organizations enjoyed 
a relatively unturbulent environment, researchers chose to address the central paradox 
bounded by the poles of differentiation and integration. Thus, Taylor (1947) sought to 
find the best way to differentiate tasks along a production line and to define the 
principles that should guide managers’ behavior for integration to be as efficient as 
possible, while Fayol (1949) and Barnard (1938) aimed at the higher echelons of the 
corporation. For Fayol, formalization of administrative principles, focusing on 
integration more than on differentiation was the loci of solution. Barnard was more 
ambitious and coupled a normative statement of the functions of the executive – all 
related to coordination roles – with a descriptive statement of the basis and need for 
differentiation that aimed to answer the ever-present economists question: why 
organizations? 
A different approach, often labelled contingency theory, emerged around the 
middle of the century. Different environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and 
technologies (Woodward, 1965) – as key contingencies – determined adoption of the 
‘correct’ organizational structure, inspiring a stream of research aimed at mapping 
different states of possible contingent factors and the organizational configurations 
adequate to each of those states (Lawrernbce & Lorsch, 1967). Later, a dynamic 
element – structural adjustment to regain fit – would be added by Donaldson (1997). 
Hence, paradox arose when different environmental and organizational states became 
misaligned. Being paradoxical was a dysfunctional fate that any organization might 
face when its structural pose and contingencies were out of kilter with each other – 
and thus would have to be realigned as a central element in strategy.  
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For management academics the best practice approach prescribes contingency 
– where patterned indeterminancy predominates, not defining any thing specifically 
so much except a means of analysis. By contrast, in the practitioner literature, the best 
practice approach prescribes not so much a method of analysis – an episteme – so 
much as a mode of organizational being – an ontology (e.g. Peters & Waterman, 
1982; Peters, 1987, 1992, 1994; Shapiro, 1995). Ontological changes in organization 
are not randomly patterned or required – they are a response to a specific social 
construction of the future of the business environment. These includes features such 
as ‘hypercompetition’ (D’Aveni, 1995), the shortening of product life cycles (Bettis & 
Hitt, 1995), the need for a highly educated work force (Drucker, 1996; Handy, 1991), 
and significantly shifting consumer tastes (Peters, 1992). A view of the future 
emerges that produces a series of standard prescriptions for organizational practice 
and strategies in an age of paradox.  
Three reasons for the increasing pervasiveness of paradox have been 
identified. The first relates to the adoption of information technology, which is 
inherently paradoxical (Johnson & Rice, 1984). For example, e-mail communication 
is at the same time both formal – it is a recorded medium – and informal - because it 
invites rapid and irretrievable response often in contexts where there is little room for 
reflection (Yates & Orlikowski, 1999).  Its implementation is often both planned and 
emergent – as people develop informal and organizationally unapproved uses for it 
(Orlikowski & Hofman, 1997). Second, environmental changes place increasingly 
contradictory demands on organizations. Taking the personal computer industry as an 
example, successful companies require a high rate of innovation while lowering costs: 
thus, the paradox they must master remains bounded by the opposite poles of 
effectiveness and efficiency (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Not only has paradox 
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become more pervasive in organizations; it has also been felt and perceived more 
acutely by organizational managers. ‘Management gurus’ articulate the problems 
organizations face in ways that enable managers readily to perceive their importance 
and urgency. However, when ‘gurus’ switch from being problem-tellers to problem-
solvers the policies and practices they commend often seem extremely counter-
intuitive for the average manager raised on a strict diet of rationality (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 1996). In addition, these prescriptions are frequently contradictory, not 
only between authors but also within the work of the same author. Tom Peters offers a 
striking example of this feature of ‘guru’ advice. In a clear allusion to the runaway 
success In Search of Excellence, he wrote later that “Excellence isn’t, there are no 
excellent companies” (Peters, 1987: 3), arguing that the prescriptions he offered with 
Waterman in the first book were wrong and fallacious. Where not seemingly irrational 
the solutions profferred more often than not involve large, multinational companies; 
thus, the resources required to deploy a problem-solution are often far beyond the 
reach of the ‘average’ company. These contradictions increase the perception of 
paradox felt by managers by creating bipolar tensions not only in the problems they 
face but also in the solutions available to handle them.  
Under the circumstances outlined, the presence of paradox becomes a problem 
in its own right (Shapiro, 1995; Peters, 1992), to which three possible – and 
paradoxical – answers emerge in the literature. The first, present in both business and 
academic literatures, states that paradox is essentially unsolvable – something to be 
sustained or endured and not to be resolved. In this vein, Miller (1993) has shown that 
success inevitably breeds failure and Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) demonstrated 
that planning always brings unintended consequences that may end up jeopardizing 
the plan itself. In the practitioner oriented literature, Peters (1992) argued that success 
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comes from both adaptivity and ‘deep grooves’ (from exploration and exploitation) 
which are outright irreconcilable while Senge (1990) contended that learning breeds 
ignorance (by hampering new learning). 
The second strategy for dealing with paradox is to reach a compromise 
between the two poles that frame it. From a contingency approach, the organization 
may choose an appropriate mix of opposites (e.g. foregoing some effectiveness in 
order to obtain more efficiency). Alternatively, deriving from an outright inability to 
maintain such a state of contingent tension, pragmatic compromise may be sought in 
the actually existing pattern of organizational actions and decisions, through managers 
coming out in favour of one side rather than the other. 
Finally, one can attempt to integrate these opposites and ‘solve’ the paradox 
through a synthesis. The organization will seek to be efficiently effective, loosely 
tight coupled, and follow a deliberately strategy of emergent change. Dialectical 
reasoning, where thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, is a potentially 
useful framework to help managers tackle paradox without having to subdue any of 
the contradictory goals it often entails.  
We will argue for the relevance of this view, showing the need for an 
integrative ‘dialectical view of management. We will present its potential for both 
theory and practice by discussing its application to what Mintzberg, Quinn and 
Ghoshal (1995) labelled manager’s foremost concerns – strategy and organization. 
We will show that this perspective is relevant in terms of both theoretical and 
practical implications. Benson (1977) argued that four overarching principles need to 
guide any approach to organization theory that is to be considered dialectical and we 
will demonstrate the goodness of fit of our criteria in these terms. 
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Fundamentals of Organizational Dialectics 
Understanding dialectical phenomena as a process means that a given condition and 
its negation come in a never-ending succession in which a thesis gives birth to its 
antithesis which in turn is transformed into its own antithesis. This view of dialectics 
started as a rhetorical strategy developed by Socrates (Durant, 1991) and found its 
highest modern expression in Marx’s (1867/1978) explanation of the historical 
evolution of society and attempt to extrapolate the future transcendence of capitalist 
systems. The underlying principles of this approach were articulated as follows by 
Engels in the Dialectics of Nature (Engels, 1873).  First, the mutual struggle of 
opposites (a phenomenon inevitably generates its opposite); second, the negation of 
the negation (the struggle of opposites is cyclical and never-ending); and third, the 
transformation of quantity into quality (incremental changes lead to discontinuous 
change).  
Blau and Scott (1962) first elaborated the merits of a dialectical approach but 
it was Benson (1973, 1977) who built an overarching argument for its relevance for 
organization theorists. Drawing on Mill’s (1962) criticisms of the analytical reliance 
of sociologists on natural dialectical laws for understanding social phenomena, 
Benson (1973) reframed bureaucratic-professional conflicts as dialectical, formulating 
four underlying principles of a dialectical approach to the study of organizations. 
These were social construction, totality, contradiction and praxis (Benson, 1977). 
Other authors followed, addressing organizational phenomenon dialectically. 
Lourenço and Glidewell (1975), for example, explicitly treated organizational conflict 
in dialectical terms, while Greiner’s (1972) understanding of the evolution of 
organizational structures shows a clear, if somewhat implicit, manifestation of this 
approach. Echoes of Engel’s principles resound in this work:  
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[D]elegation, which grows out of and becomes the solution to, demands for greater 
autonomy in the preceding [revolution] eventually provokes a major revolutionary crisis 
that is characterized by attempts to regain control over the diversity created through 
increased delegation (Greiner, 1972: 84).  
 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
In essence, a dialectical approach develops a process model of organizations 
through contradictory, antithetical stages (table 1 categorizes major contributions 
towards a dialectical view of management). Contemporary representations of 
contradictions, tensions and paradoxes in the management literature suggest that 
thesis and antithesis not only occur in succession but can also be present 
simultaneously (Clegg & Hardy, 1996). In consequence, some authors have adopted a 
more ‘static’ approach to dialectical phenomena in organizations. Such views are 
grounded in Heraclitus’ view of dialectics, as developed by Hegel (1892),  as a 
phenomenon where two distinct/contradictory entities engage each other in conflict 
generating a synthesis that incorporates, and differs from, them both (Durant, 1991; 
Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). The application of this approach to organizational 
research, however, has been limited to isolated themes. Historically, Follett (1940a; 
1940b) showed how autonomy and control could be coupled in an organization. More 
recently, Edelman and Benning (1998) argued for the possibility of incrementally 
punctuated organizational change. Yates and Orlikowski (1999) and Orlikowski and 
Yates (1998) showed how organizational communication can be both formal and 
informal and how opposite views of organizational time can be integrated. Brews and 
Hunt (1999) contended that strategy could be simultaneously emergent and deliberate. 
Nonetheless, none of these authors has put forth an integrative view of management 
from a ‘static dialectics’ lens, such as Benson (1977) has done for ‘process dialectics’. 
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However, they have suggested both the pervasiveness of paradox in organizational 
life and the potential that dialectics has in providing insights for researching and 
resolving these paradoxes. Drawing on these streams of research, a dialectical model 
of organization, strategy and change can be developed. The point of doing this is to 
show the potential integration of these findings as groundwork for future dialectical 
understanding of organizational phenomena. To accomplish such a task, we will look 
at research on the workings of opposing forces in organizations, such as planning and 
action (Crossan & Sorrenti, 1997; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 1998b), organization 
and disorganization (Weick, 1995), incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), and exploration and exploitation (March, 1991; 
Orlikowski, 1996). We will argue that these can be harnessed via synthesis for the 
benefit of an organization’s competitiveness and sustained success. 
 
Dialectical Strategy 
One of the most pervasive debates in management is that between the ‘planning 
school’ (Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, Portner, & Radosevich, 1970) and the ‘learning 
school’ (Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985). Proponents of planning 
argue that the main triggers of organizational action are pre-planned events (Miller & 
Cardinal, 1994). The way to sustained competitiveness is seen to derive from 
excellence in environmental scanning and organizational assessment. Using these, 
organizations must combine their strengths with market opportunities to form a plan 
for subsequent implementation (Porter, 1982). This approach produces high efficiency 
outcomes because resources are allocated only to more profitable business units 
(Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). However, it is a process of low effectiveness because 
organizationally committed obedience to plan hinders managers’ flexibility and 
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reaction speed. From this perspective, strategy results from mostly deliberate action, 
emanating from the organization’s will as expressed in the discipline of a long-range 
plan. 
From the other perspective, those that espouse the ‘learning’ school contend 
that the high level of turbulence most companies now experience cannot be handled 
via reflection alone (or at all) (Lindblom, 1959). Instead, organizational action should 
be triggered by any event in the environment that is perceived as either a threat or as 
an opportunity, not only by those events prescribed in the plan. The members of the 
‘action school’, who are the more radical adherents of this view, argue that even 
without the presence of environmental stimuli for action, organizations must change 
and experiment. The rationale for this statement is twofold. First, since environments 
are social constructions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985) and 
are enacted (Weick, 1995), stimuli may be misperceived as absent when they are in 
fact present; thus, uncalled-for action allows for refinement of the organization-wide 
perception of the environment. Second, experiments allow the organization to shape 
its environment, increasing its competitive basis and depleting that of its competitors 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). In this vein, strategy is a highly effective process rather 
than a determinate plan. The non-existence of a formal plan permits high flexibility 
and reaction speed, allowing organizational members to reap unexpected 
opportunities or parry unexpected threats from the environment (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
There is a downside to the process view. What is gained in effectiveness is 
often lost in efficiency. The use of experiments is costly, due to the often low ratio of 
successes over failures (Cooper, 1979) and the danger of the organization ‘spreading 
itself too thin’ over numerous opportunities. Very flexible strategic processes carry no 
guarantee of being effective (Miner, Moorman & Bassoff, 1996). Thus, from this 
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perspective, the results of a company’s strategy are mostly emergent and only appear 
coherent via a post-hoc interpretation of elapsed, and future perfect, actions 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1982). 
Recently, a synthesis between these two views of strategy has been emerging. 
The synthesis of organizational improvisation allows for an integration between 
planning and action, without calling for a compromise between these opposites nor 
for the presence of one despite of the other (table 2 summarizes this approach). The 
organizational improvisation or ‘real-time planning’ approach, shows that 
learning/‘action’ strategies happen because of a plan and not in spite of it (Weick, 
1998). Such a view of strategy sees organizational action being triggered when 
environmental stimuli call for fast, flexible action grounded on a pre-formulated plan, 
a plan aimed at providing the grounds for such a posture. Jazz musician’s use of 
musical scores to improvise collectively (Berliner, 1994), and Shell’s use of scenario 
planning to respond to an unexpected discontinuity in oil prices (Wack, 1985) are two 
examples. From this perspective plans can be used to foster adaptiveness and 
flexibility, resulting in a process that is both effective and efficient. It is effective 
because the plan is used to foster flexibility by creating an unobtrusive means of 
coordination that allows action to be integrated towards a common goal (Bastien & 
Hostager, 1988), thus permitting a substantial degree of flexibility. It is efficient 
because the bricolage dimension of improvisation (handling tasks with available 
resources) allows the organization to deploy its resources in multiple uses and thus 
escape from the increasing costs that use of specialized resources for planned or 
emergent activities normally entails (Scribner, 1986). As far as results go, one can 
classify improvisation as a deliberately emergent strategy inasmuch as a deliberate 
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plan is composed in order to facilitate the organization’s ability to adapt and swiftly 
respond to emerging internal and external threats and opportunities (Barrett, 1998). 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
Organizational improvisation is grounded on the realization that organizations 
prefer following plans to constantly re-inventing themselves (Weick, 1998). From this 
perspective, organization depends on the pre-existence of a plan and organizational 
infrastructure to guide practice. However, these are not the only two factors needed to 
plan in real time. Some additional conditions are necessary for the practice of 
improvisation and one can unearth a set of influence factors that determine its success. 
These conditions and influencing factors can be grouped, using a dialectical lens, 
along three synthetic axes: (1) an experimental culture coupled with tight controls; (2) 
memory both as friend and foe; and (3) skilled individuals coupled with unskilled 
resources. 
As far as the first synthesis goes, a mix of formal controls can help foster an 
experimental culture. Such a culture results from a set of values and beliefs that 
promote action and experimentation – as opposed to reflection and planning – as a 
way of understanding and dealing with reality. To paraphrase Peters (1992), one 
replaces a ‘ready, …, ready, aim, aim, …, aim, fire’ approach one that stresses ‘fire, 
…, fire, aim, fire’. For this to happen, an organization has to, at a minimum, tolerate 
errors and ideally espouse what Weick (1999) calls an ‘aesthetic of imperfection’. 
This kind of organization cultures have strong ‘pro-innovation’ biases that exhibit 
themselves in sensemaking: for example, in a belief that a great plan can only be 
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accomplished through finding an emerging pattern in actions taken in the past (Weick, 
1995).  
To foster innovative sensemaking cultures, such companies use two major 
mechanisms. First, they reward people based on the number of ‘competent mistakes’ 
they have made (a competent mistake resulting from novel ideas and not from flawed 
execution) (Picken & Dess, 1997). Second, they tap the power of symbolic action and 
stories as third order controls (Perrow, 1986; Weick, 1999), by diffusing tales of 
‘competent mistakes’ as role models for the organization’s members. 
Another value that an organization must espouse for improvisation to occur is 
that of urgency. The occurrence of unexpected and ‘unplanned-for’ events is not 
enough for improvisation to happen. Additionally, those that address such irruptions 
should feel that it can only be addressed through fast action (Perry, 1991). Otherwise 
they can fall back on planning (because they perceive that they have time to do so) 
instead of being pushed to compose a course of action in real-time – a far more 
daunting process than the former (Eisenberg, 1990). 
In order for enterprising, innovative sensemaking cultures must be coupled 
with a mix of control mechanisms that shape convergence around organization-wide 
goals. Otherwise they risk sharp disaggregation and might cross the thin line between 
flexibile and unproductive, random, action (Stacey, 1991).  
The control mix comprises three major elements: these are first and second 
order ‘invisible’ controls, milestones and clear goals. On controls, most authors on 
improvisation argue that the only kind of mechanisms applicable in an organization 
that aims to improvise are third order, meaning indirect controls that coordinate via 
culture or ideology (Perrow, 1986; Mintzberg, 1995; Weick, 1993a). Justification can 
be found in the work of Dougherty who shows the difficulties in pursuing novel 
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actions in organizations stifled by first (direct supervision) and second 
(standardization) order mechanisms of coordination (Dougherty, 1996). However, 
drawing on recent findings in critical studies of organizational control, we contend 
that improvisation can occur in environments with abundant first and second order 
mechanisms in play. The touchstone of controlling improvisers resides not in the 
degree of obtrusiveness of such mechanisms but in their invisibility. Direct 
supervision can be ‘delegated’ from superior to peers allowing for the maintenance of 
coordination without hampering creativity (Sewell, 1998). For instance, in jazz, band 
members are often chosen because of their reputation as able improvisers not among 
critics but among fellow players (Hatch, 1999). Second order controls can also be 
rendered invisible by incorporating them in the production technology itself (be it one 
of tangible goods or services) (Joerges & Czarniawska, 1998; Barley & Kunda, 1992).  
Second, milestones or action deadlines have been found to be an effective 
mechanism for maintaining the momentum/sense of urgency triggered by unexpected 
and ‘unplanned-for’ events (Gardner & Roggoff, 1990). Milestones represent 
opportunities to perform a check between current actions and the development of 
situations the organization is facing, allowing detection of what, from the legitimated 
perspective of the underlying organizational score, might be construed as deviations 
or misperceptions that need correction (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). Moreover, 
milestones are set in advance and planned, thus providing a sense of 
structure/routinization to improvisational activities often perceived to result from 
chaos and disorder (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Finally, milestones serve as 
moments of feedback as partial stages/steps are concluded and thus, potentially 
increase individual motivation – building momentum and the sense of urgency needed 
for improvisation to be sustained. 
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Finally, clearly articulated goals serve the all-important function of ensuring 
that improvisational activity amounts to the attainment of organizational objectives. 
Clearly articulated goals perform, in organizational settings, a very similar function to 
that of the song in jazz improvisation. They are akin to a magnetic field (or a strange 
attractor, to use the vocabulary of complexity theory) that, although not prescribing 
individual action, are strongly normative concerning the results of such action 
(Weick, 1993a). They also contribute to coordination among individual members by 
defining the results of their activity in a similar process to that of standardization of 
outputs (Mintzberg, 1995). 
Memory, the second synthesis states, can be both helpful and harmful to 
improvisation. On the one hand, as far as procedural memory goes, a small number of 
routines are a central condition for improvisation. In this light, improvisation appears 
to occur only when an organization/individual does not have adequate 
routine/procedural memory to respond to an unexpected situation (Moorman & 
Miner, 1995). In situations for which an adequate routine does exist, then 
improvisation will be highly unlikely. The rationale for this hypothesis has several 
grounds. First, it would be inefficient to improvise when an effective response that 
covers the situation is already stored in memory; second, these response processes are 
often unconscious, automatic and undetectedly autonomous, lowering the 
deliberateness of choice. However, in spite of empirical proof that procedural 
organizational memory does hinder improvisation (Moorman & Miner, 1998b), it is at 
least theoretically arguable that the opposite is also true. If we understand routines as 
grammars (Pentland & Rueter, 1994), knowing that elements in a grammar can be 
combined in infinite possibilities, then procedural memory would be the 
organizational counterpart of a score, one that organizational improvisers could 
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embellish/modify at will during action (Moorman & Miner, 1998a; Weick, 1998). 
There is empirical evidence for this viewpoint. In a study of improvisation in the 
computer industry, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) found that firms with established 
routines were more likely to improvise. Although organizational memory hinders 
improvisation, its effects can be severely attenuated if organizations use its elements 
to create new routines as action is unfolding.  
Declarative memory, or knowledge of facts (Anderson, 1983), is related to 
qualitative variations of organizational improvisation. It plays an important role in the 
degree of improvisation: the more facts an organization knows the broader and, 
arguably, more diversified is its basis for creativity and thus for improvisation 
(Amabile, 1998; Woodman, Sawyer & Griffin, 1993; Moorman & Miner, 1998b). 
Nonetheless, a wide span of declarative memory may also slow the speed of 
improvisation because of the amount of time that individuals must invest in searching 
through all available alternatives (Moorman & Miner, 1998a), although one could 
argue that bounded rationality would act to counter this phenomenon (Simon, 1990). 
Regarding the synthesis between specialization and generality, improvisation seems to 
call for skilled individuals to deal with unskilled/general-purpose resources.  
Having skilled individuals in an organization that aims to be proficient at real-
time planning implies, first and foremost, that the level of performative skill that each 
individual possesses determines their ability to pursue improvisational activity distant 
from organizational routine (Weick, 1993a, 1999; Crossan, White, Lane & Klus, 
1996). Additionally, when improvisation is a group phenomenon, the group’s 
improvisational performance will be limited by the ability of its least skilled member 
(Bastien & Hostager, 1991; Hatch, 1999). The relevance given to skill rests on it 
being a vehicle for creativity to be put in practice. Thus, individual creativity is also 
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an important trait that improvisers must possess (Erickson, 1982; Crossan, 1998). 
Only high levels of individual creativity will allow for radical departures from current 
organizational practice. According to Weick, it is the latter that reflect “purer 
instances of improvisation” (1998: 545), with lower level being ‘variations’ or 
‘embellishments’ that still retain much of the original routine/idea and that may not be 
as effective.  
Another organizational attribute of improvisation is member skill diversity. 
Homogeneous organizations are not prone to diverse approaches in solving problems 
or to reaping opportunities (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Thus, the ‘novel’ element of 
organization improvisation will be seriously compromised if the organization does not 
benefit from a diverse population. Such organizations will probably be limited to 
mere embellishments or small variations upon existing ideas, products, practices and 
routines (Weick, 1998, 1999; Hatch, 1997).  
The resources that the individual/team/organization possesses are better able 
to improvise if they are less skilled and specialized. In fact, specialized and limited 
purpose resources can thwart improvisation by limiting organizational members’ 
ability to turn their ideas into innovative practice. Conversely, multi-purpose 
resources are flexible enough to be deployed in a variety of uses, even if those uses 
were never part of the organization’s stated intentions (or even imagination) for their 
applicability (Weick, 1993a). Thus, resource flexibility affects improvisation by 
augmenting the possible courses of action an organization can take. General-purpose 
resources reduce the number of constraints upon those conceiving action as it unfolds, 
thus augmenting their potential degree of departure from standard practice/ideas and 
ultimately, their ability to reach ‘purer’ forms of improvisation.Taking these three 
syntheses into account, improvisation can be seen as an integration between planning 
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and action and thus offers a path for those attempting to build a dialectical view of 
management.  
 
Dialectical Organization 
Paralleling the debate between the ‘planning’ and the ‘action’ schools, both 
academicians and practitioners have been discussing whether the 
hierarchical/bureaucratic organizational model should be maintained or whether 
organizations should migrate to self-management forms such as the network. Those 
espousing the ‘hierarchy’ school argue that the existence of tacit knowledge 
(Prigogine, 1984), technological, human physical and mental limitations (Barnard, 
1938) and the appeal of lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1971), justify the need 
for hierarchy and order-based relationships.  Their emphasis is on the mechanisms 
that allow differentiation of workers in specialized roles and on how to control their 
efforts in order to attain higher-order organizational goals. These control mechanisms 
are often of a formal nature because organizational growth makes interpersonal 
coordination (e.g. mutual adjustment and direct supervision) very inefficient and 
sometimes impossible (Greiner, 1972). Standardization of procedures, outputs and 
skills are thus favored integration devices (Mintzberg, 1995). Control, and not mere 
coordination, seems to be the main goal of this type of organizations. 
Opposing this view are those claiming that changes in the environment, such 
as a higher competitive pressure (Bettis & Hitt, 1995) and a better educated worforce 
(Handy, 1991; Drucker, 1996) both allow and demand a shift towards self 
managed/network-based organizational forms. Drawing on research on organizational 
learning, this view argues that shared values and beliefs are more pervasive than the 
‘hierarchy’ view holds. Moreover, these serve as a powerful normalizing force that 
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invisibly bind organizational members to shared mental models of themselves, the 
organization, and its relevant environments (Argyris & Schön, 1992; Senge, 1990). 
Thus, the major challenge for an organization is to harness this force in order to attain 
a higher integration level, one that allows employees as a group to meet the 
diversity/complexity of the environment (Emery & Trist, 1965; Stacey, 1996). 
Integration is thus assured by informal controls such as culture, transmitted by 
socialization and rituals (Schein, 1985), in an attempt to manage what the ‘hierarchy’ 
approach leaves unattended – and which thwarts its ability to change and adapt. The 
major goal of the ‘self-management’ view is to foster coordination by integration 
through engaging organizational members in the process of building a shared mental 
model of where the organization is and where it wants to go. 
 The integration of these two opposing perspectives into a synthesis has 
already been attempted. Mary Parker Follet’s writings on business as an integrative 
unity (Follett, 1940a) showed how to integrate the disparate needs of employers and 
employees. When she addressed order-giving (Follett, 1940b) she showed how 
framing orders as a ‘law of the situation’ instead of as a personal demand from 
management allows the coordination and control of employee action while freeing it 
to take whatever course is adequate for the task at hand. Follett, however, did not take 
into account the pervasive role of culture and manufacturing technology as powerful, 
yet unobtrusive control and limitation mechanisms able to hinder diversity in 
responses (Barker, 1993). 
Drawing on Follett’s work, we propose an integrative view of organization, 
which favors integrative differentiation (table 3 summarizes this approach). Again, we 
present a set of syntheses to make this argument: (1) trusting unknown organizational 
members even at a distance (minimal trust), (2) uncommitted commitment (minimal 
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commitment), (3) agreeing on disagreeing (minimal consensus) and; (4) controlling to 
liberate (minimal structure).  
----------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
In the first synthesis, the apparent paradox is the use of trust as an integrative 
mechanism when it is not grounded in interpersonal ties but in stereotypes. Such a use 
exempts organizational members from the personal disclosure that trust-based 
organizational forms often entail (McAllister, 1995) allowing for the necessary 
differentiation needed to meet the complexity of turbulent environments (Emery & 
Trist, 1965). Minimal trust amounts to organizational members trusting someone they 
do not know. The elements normally associated with building trust are kept at a 
minimum level, just about that necessary to fight fragmentation. The point here is to 
create the conditions needed for trust to emerge (the belief that the individual with 
whom one is interacting will act in a way that is beneficial or at least not detrimental 
to oneself) with the minimum level of commonality and personal disclosure. Such an 
outcome is accomplished by coordinating by means of a generalized other (Jarvenpaa 
and Shaw, 1998) instead of social similarity. In this type of coordination trust arises 
from a self-fulfilling prophecy of trustworthiness that the individual develops, based 
on stereotypes of interactants and on previous network/team experiences.  
Indoctrination mechanisms have an important role to play in the trust process. 
The purpose of indoctrination is not just related to the inculcation of particular 
organizational values and beliefs but the facilitation of coordination by a generalized 
other. The process aims to create favorable stereotypes of the categories of people 
newcomers are prone to interact with and seeks to develop a favorable attitude 
  22 
towards working in trust-based settings (Armstrong and Cole, 1995). Creating an 
attitude conducive to trusting other members of the organization is ultimately 
equivalent to fostering institution-based trust, in the sense that members are trusted on 
the basis of their affiliation with the organization (Frances, Levacic, Mitchell & 
Thompson, 1991). For this to be possible, a different (one is tempted to say 
‘minimal’) conception of culture and structure must also be present. 
The second and third synthesis can be grouped under the umbrella of a 
‘minimal’ organizational culture. High levels of commitment and consensus, favored 
by much of the prescriptive management literature, will be replaced by minimal levels 
of each. As far as minimal commitment goes, its purpose is to promote the level of 
commitment needed to assure the necessary level of performance on behalf of the 
individual, while avoiding blind adherence to individual, group and organizational 
decisions. While organizational members take the success of the organization as a 
central value, they do so in the context of being open to information against the grain 
of this commitment – information that goes against decisions made by them both as 
individuals and as group or organization members. 
The dynamics that underlie a ‘healthy’ level of commitment to an organization 
are coincidental with those that explain individual and group pathologies, such as 
groupthink and individual defensive routines (Janis, 1972; Argyris, 1992; Harvey, 
1996). Commitment should be seen as the result of attempts to resolve cognitive 
dissonance that come from making public and explicit choices without sufficient 
external justification (Salancik, 1977; Eiser, 1980). The challenge lies in promoting a 
set of values and beliefs that fosters a positive attitude towards public and explicit 
errors (Weick, 1999). This attenuates the need for triggering dissonance reduction 
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processes because the organization values mistakes, as long as they are an input for 
learning (Sitkin, 1992).  
Minimal commitment needs, however, to be coupled with minimal consensus, 
in order to more effectively avoid the negative consequences of strong cultures, 
without losing the unobtrusiveness of the controls they rely on. Minimal consensus is 
grounded on the premise that a diversity of perceptions favors a richer understanding 
of the environment and, therefore, allows an organization to act in a more informed 
way (Starbuck, 1965). Moreover, diversity in the composition of the organization’s 
population allows a wider repertoire of solutions and a higher level of flexibility 
(Hedberg, Nystrom & Starbuck, 1976). These characteristics facilitate, in turn, a 
higher degree of adaptability to changing environments (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) 
– the reason why trust-based organizations are adopted in the first place (Powell, 
1990). External complexity, which can reach significantly high values in this kind of 
environments (Emery and Trist, 1965), is matched with the complexity of individual 
organizational members, instead of with the complexity of organizational design 
(Weick, 1993a). In short, the organization copes with environmental complexity by 
having diverse members instead of adopting complex structural forms. 
Minimal consensus rests on a deliberate and intentional effort to reduce 
commonalities among organizational members to the minimum level required for 
integration to be feasible. Thus, minimal consensus abandons the pursuit of common 
perceptions of the environment, values and beliefs, promoting instead the 
compatibility of perceptions, values and beliefs on the part of different organizational 
members. The purpose of this is to allow trust to emerge through a perception of 
compatibility rather than one of similarity (Weick, 1993b). In this way, individuals 
acknowledge that they hold a valuable perception of reality but also realize that this 
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perception is limited, and its real action taking and decision making power can only 
be harnessed when combined with different views from other members. It is 
important, though, that those perceptions, although not being identical, are compatible 
in the sense that they illuminate a certain reality from different but complementary (as 
opposed to antagonistic) perspectives (Hedberg et al., 1976). 
Finally, the fourth synthesis, which we label ‘minimal structure’, is constituted 
by three elements: (1) coordination by action, (2) based on a minimal set of rules and 
on a (3) shared social objective. Due to the absence of a strong culture from which 
trust and coordination can be derived, this type of organization replaces a shared 
system of values, beliefs and perceptions, by coordination through action. This means 
that the integration of the individual efforts of organizational members does not rely 
on sharing the same culture but on having a compatible perception of the challenges 
posed by the environment (Weick, 1993a), one that creates a ‘law of the situation’ 
(Follett, 1940b) for individuals to obey. As in coordination by culture, this is still a 
third order control. However, it promotes, instead of hinders, diversity, by fostering 
the emergence of compatible (as opposed to shared) views of a problem or 
opportunity, that allow for a broad variety of alternative courses of action to appear 
(Eisenberg, 1990). 
Control in minimal networks is also achieved through a small set of rules that 
govern the interaction among their members (Weick, 1999; Bastien and Hostager, 
1991). These rules can emerge from the nature of the task faced by the group or from 
broader social norms (Hatch, 1997). As far as the nature of the task is concerned, 
these rules are embodied in a restricted set of cognitive and behavioral alternatives 
that the members can choose from. In spite of the diversity desirable in this kind of 
organization, the set of alternatives is restricted because of the necessary compatibility 
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among members for minimal integration to occur (Brown & Duguid, 1991). Such a 
set of alternatives can be equated to an organizational grammar: a set of elements and 
combination rules among elements that allow for the formation of an almost infinite 
set of different courses of action, from a limited set of inputs (Pentland and Rueter, 
1994). In minimal networks, social norms are limited to those coming from the 
professional and industry-specific cultures of its members (Hutchins, 1991). The 
organization should restrain itself in adding to these rules, at the expense of limiting 
the scope of diversity (Weick, 1995). 
Another important mechanism of coordination in minimal networks is a shared 
social objective. Because of the parsimony of control mechanisms, organization goals 
must be explicitly shared by members (Orr, 1990). Where they are not, although 
individual teams can respond adequately to problems or opportunities in the 
environment, they will do so on an ad hoc basis that can increase the fragmentation of 
the organization as a whole in a continuous fashion, compromising its long-term 
integrity (Senge, 1990). 
In conclusion, we may note that a ‘minimal’ view insists that a dialectical 
approach to organization is not only possible but also desirable in light of the 
paradoxes managers and workers often confront. That the concepts of dialectical 
strategy and dialectical organization offers a synthesis between two opposing schools 
demonstrates that there is potential for a dialectical view of management. For this 
demonstration to be complete, we will draw on Benson’s (1997) four principles of a 
dialectical view of organization theory. Although this author’s approach is wedded to 
a ‘process’ view of dialectics, the underlying principles of his approach appear to 
apply to a ‘static’ perspective as well, as we elaborate in the next section. 
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Towards a Dialectical View of Management 
The principle of social construction calls for the identification of both a source of 
constraint and a source of deviation/construction. As far as dialectical strategy goes, 
the source of constraint is the plan, i.e. the ‘minimal’ prescribed part of strategy that 
allows for adaptivity to emerge (Brews & Hunt, 1999). Its source of variation comes 
from the stimuli that press the organization/individual to adapt and to be flexible as 
action unfolds and from the ability to ‘bricolate’ with and around the prescribed plan 
(Berry & Irvine, 1986).  As far as dialectical organization goes, the source of 
constraint is the minimally formalized structure, including shared goals and the 
stereotypes acquired in the indoctrination process. Deviation and construction comes 
from the perception of errors as learning opportunities (Sitkin, 1992) and from the 
role of action as a ground for coordination (Follett, 1940b). 
The principle of totality calls for finding an underlying ‘whole’ to which semi-
autonomous parts are linked. At the organizational level, the ‘whole’ behind an 
instance of a dialectical strategy is the overarching action culture that grounds it. 
Individually, looking at this phenomenon as an enactment of distilled experience 
(Crossan & Sorrenti, 1997), a high level of skill frames organizational members’ life 
experiences as the background that allows for discrete instances of improvisation to 
appear (Hatch, 1999). These overarching elements notwithstanding, each dialectical 
strategy is autonomous in the way that it depends on the specific details of the plan 
driving it and on the people working towards it. Dialectical organizations, on their 
side, take much of their rules and structure from general societal norms (Bastien & 
Hostager, 1988; Eisenberg, 1990) and depend on the diversity of their members, 
encompassing a wide span of settings in which a particular organization is just a 
single element. Nonetheless, each organization deploys norms and diversity in a mix 
that renders it partially autonomous. 
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The principle of contradiction offers the clearest illustration of dialectics. 
Contradiction only emerges where two opposing forces are at work. The fact that 
plans necessarily possess an emergent component (Minztber & McHugh, 1985), either 
because of the complexity of environmental interaction or because of communication 
distortion, allows us to uncover this principle in a dialectical strategy. The fact that 
human interaction creates an informal ‘shadow’ system in every formal structure 
(Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993; Sayles, 1989) allows us to do the same regarding the 
concept of dialectical organization. 
Finally, praxis (which Benson [1977: 5] defines as “free and creative 
construction of social arrangements”) is also visible in both concepts. Dialectical 
strategies are often prone to formalization, which eventually ends up creating 
punctuated change via an incremental process (Edelman & Benning, 1998). 
Dialectical organizations, with their low levels of commitment and consensus, allow 
their arrangements to be in permanent reconstruction, in a state of ‘organizing’ and 
becoming rather than being (Weick, 1979). 
Summing up, we go beyond the current state of the art of dialectical 
perspectives on management – which has been focusing on demonstrating its 
relevance and applying itself to several disconnected fields of management inquiry – 
by proposing a set of underlying principles for ‘static’ management dialectics. This is 
done with the purpose of providing a novel basis for research into the paradoxes 
present in organizations and a new understanding for practitioners to benefit from 
those paradoxes. Four principles guide this approach: simultaneity, locality, 
minimality and generality (table 2 contrasts these with those of a ‘process’ approach). 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 4 about here 
  28 
----------------------------- 
Simultaneity means that a dialectical view of management is grounded on the 
interplay of contradictory forces and not on the attempt to subdue one to the other. 
Under this principle, a thesis does not exist despite its antithesis but because of it. 
Each pole of the dialectic needs the other to sustain its presence. The concepts of 
dialectical strategy and dialectical organization support this argument. Research has 
shown that, from a dialectical view of strategy, the design of a ‘minimal’ plan, where 
goals and deadlines are scrupulously prescribed and enforced, enhances the firm’s 
flexibility and adaptability to unexpected internal and external shifts (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997). Additionally, Hutchins (1991) proved that some level of structure 
is needed for informal cooperation to emerge, and Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) 
found that loosely coupled structures were heavily dependent upon highly structured 
relationships and reward systems. Thus, a second insight from this principle is to shift 
the role of the manager from one of choice between the poles of a given paradox, as 
contingency theory prescribes (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Instead, paradoxes will be 
surfaced, held, lived, experienced, their visiblity promoting integration between its 
opposites. In fact, Follett (1940b) contended that using the ‘situation’ as a source of 
‘law’ (i.e. orders) allowed integration between a directive and a democratic approach 
to leadership and organization. Weick’s research into firefighting has eloquently 
demonstrated this point and shown how rules and plans are critical in unexpected and 
unplanned-for situations (Weick, 1993b). Finally, simultaneity means that one can 
seldom escape paradox in managerial life. Mintzberg has documented the close 
linkage between deliberate and emergent strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; 
Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985), showing that emergent and unplanned/unintended 
action will probably sprout from the most deliberate of plans. There are two brief 
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explanations for this phenomenon. The first is that communication distortion impedes 
people in understanding a message exactly as its conveyor understands it (Mintzberg, 
1990). The second is that changes in the environment surrounding most businesses 
(Bettis & Hitt, 1995) has shifted towards a state of turbulence, where emergence is the 
norm because of the complexity of relationships between environmental factors 
(Emery & Trist, 1965; Lane & Maxfield, 1996).  
Locality means that the synthesis between two opposing poles of a paradox 
does not result from an overarching design effort but from case-by-case enactment. 
The first inference one can make from this principle is that a synthesis is a local 
phenomenon; it results from the decisions taken by an organization or individual 
concerning a specific challenge or problem. Secondly, this synthesis occurs not in 
reflection but in action. Given most organization’s biases towards pre-conception 
(Weick, 1998), few would endure the poles of paradoxes dealing with deviation from 
current practice if it were not because of poignant challenges from the environment 
(Mintzberg, 1996). Moreover, it is these demands for action that permits and 
facilitates the integration between opposites as action unfolds (Crossan & Sorrenti, 
1997; Crossan, 1997). Finally, and in spite of this, the transition from local responses 
to organizational (global) routines is possible. This is accomplished as positive results 
in responses circulate throughout the organization via stories (Orr, 1990) that get 
shared and slowly creep into the organization’s memory (Moorman and Miner, 1998a, 
1998b).   
Again, the concepts of dialectical strategy and dialectical organization support 
these claims. The ‘planned’ part of a dialectical strategy would go forever undisturbed 
without an external event demanding flexibility because of the bias of most 
organizations towards planning (Weick, 1998). It is only in response to such an event 
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that organizations/individuals adapt in and around a plan and through action, creating 
novel solutions that may end up stored in the organization’s memory, be it procedural 
or declarative (Miner, Moorman & Bassoff, 1996; Vera & Crossan, 1999). As far as 
organizing goes, research into innovation implementation and group cooperation has 
shown that structures are often as enduring as the life span of a project (Johnson & 
Rice, 1987) and that these structures emerge from action, which acts as the prime 
coordination mechanism (Bastien & Hostager, 1988). Additionally, these 
organizational configurations are often formalized and crystallized in the organization 
(Orlikowski, 1996). 
Minimality means that the ability to use a paradox to build a synthesis depends 
on maintaining only sufficient levels of each of the paradox’s poles in order to avoid 
one taking over the other. There are three arguments underlying this principle. The 
first is that, as complexity theory posits, big effects come from small causes 
(Prigogine, 1984). Thus, syntheses come from creating the necessary ‘strange 
attractors’ to create an ‘organizational force field’ that will bind corporate action, 
preventing it from falling into a too close orbit around one of the poles of paradox. 
Two different tasks are called for. These are the two remaining arguments sustaining 
this principle: creating the necessary (1) quantity and (2) quality of structure – latu 
sensu (i.e. plans, rules, procedures, and organizational configurations) for integration 
to be possible. As far as quantity goes, this implies searching the level that is 
sufficient for synthesis to emerge while taking care to stay on the thin line that 
separates stifling order from entropic disorder (the ‘edge of chaos’ [Stacey, 1991; 
Pascale, 1999]) and that integrates them both (Lane & Robert, 1996). As far as quality 
goes, this calls for procuring the type of structure whose unobtrusiveness allows for a 
dialectical strategy and a dialectical organization to thrive (Sewell, 1998). Otherwise, 
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independently of how small that structure is, its effect will always be more akin to 
restraint than to liberate. Thus, a dialectical strategy not only needs plans more akin to 
a jazz score than to classical music (the latter having many more prescribed notes to 
be played [Perry, 1991]), but also requires plans that do away with prescribed actions 
and replaces them with goals and deadlines (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). In the same 
vein, a dialectical organization not only needs fewer controls but less visible ones. 
Although one can expand the span of control almost to infinity, this will not transmit 
the perception of freedom of action as might an empowerment program but it will 
reduce the perceived amount of control one has to endure (McGregor, 1960). 
Replacing orders with the law of the situation (Follett, 1940b), superior supervision 
with peer vigilance (Romme, 1999), and procedural specification with technological 
limitations, goes a long way to promoting nimbler organizational forms. 
Generality means that the ‘minimal’ prescribed and pre-conceived resources 
possess a high degree of generality. The first insight emerging from this principle is 
the need to ‘tolerate’ opposites. If results have to be effective and efficient, structured 
and unstructured, and deliberate and emergent, then individuals and resources cannot 
be committed (i.e. specialized) to a set of courses of action/solutions.They must be 
flexible enough to accommodate several of these, which may be more contradictory 
than not (cf. the concept of patching [Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999]). The second insight 
is that the resources available to organizational members, be they materials, plans, 
structures or information systems, must be ‘fool-proof’. This means shifting the 
responsibility for avoiding dysfunction from the individual to the organization 
(Anderson, 1983) by embedding what is formalized in mechanisms for avoiding such 
dysfunction. Instead of relying on recruiting some special kind of employees that do 
not fall to groupthink (Janis, 1972), one could build an organization and a strategy 
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that subsumes this type of behavior in an emergent strategy. Finally, generality allows 
us to answer what some consider the greatest paradox in modern organizations – the 
dilemma between effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. Peters, 1992; Bennis, 1989). By 
relying on general resources and plans, an organization can shift strategy and form 
using bricolage, i.e. ‘making do’ with available resources (Levi-Strauss, 1966) 
without having to acquire new ones and thus exploiting those it possesses even as it 
changes direction.  
In a dialectical view of organization and strategy, plans and configurations, 
allow for several syntheses to emerge. Plans that do not specify steps but instead 
provide major goals and deadlines allow for innovation to take place with high levels 
of efficiency (Sobek, Ward & Liker, 1999). Such plans allow organizations to adapt to 
unexpected circumstances, as Perry (1991) shows, thus enabling realized strategy to 
be both a more deliberate endeavor and one that leaves space for opposite directions 
to be woven into a synthesis. Such plans are generally simple enough to be 
understood and improvised upon even by the most junior of organizational members 
(see Orlikowski, 1996, for an example). While organizing dialectically, one relies on 
systems which allow and facilitate apparently opposite goals (such as simultaneously 
controlling and liberating), which do not require considerable skill because they are 
embedded in the general organizational fabric or built into the technology of 
production (Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998). Examples would be the use of MBO and 
mentoring. Additionally, unobtrusive controls allow space for creative effectiveness-
seeking behavior to emerge within the frame of the cultural normalization necessary 
for efficiency to be attained (Sewell, 1998). 
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Conclusion 
Paradoxes flourish where environmental changes and situational opportunities are 
creatively engaged with organizational theory and practice. Traditionally, some 
authors have drawn on a process view of dialectics to show how the opposing poles of 
paradox succeed each other in through contradictions that are generated and resolved 
in the course of time. New competitive landscapes demand more of organizations. 
Contradictions co-exist in time and must be tackled simultaneously. The innovation is 
this paper is to suggest ways in which paradoxes may be a permanent and creative 
feature of organizational life – which we refer to (in the paradoxical spirit of our 
paper) as ‘static dialectics’ – where opposites exist simultaneously instead of in 
succession. We provided an integrative framework as a dialectial synthesis capable of 
development into insights for practice. We drew on four principles that underlie a 
‘static dialectical’ view of management, in compliance with Benson’s (1977) basic 
principles of dialectical analysis. The paper goes beyond current theory in several 
ways. It presents the potential for an overarching view of management as an act of 
synthesis. It provides a platform for integrating separate and somewhat implicit 
research findings from various fields of inquiry. Thus, it is integrative. Static 
dialectics, in its view of management, recognises the increasing importance of the 
simultaneity of opposite forces and demands upon organizations. Thus, it is coherent 
rather than incoherent in its view of organizational realities. Finally, its take on 
dialectical phenomena in organizations provides a basis for empirical investigation 
and practical action. Thus, it is reflexive, both for theory and practice. In terms of 
theory, we have shown the potential of our dialectical view to make sense of what 
managers do when they seemingly act diachronically in ways that are not sensible, 
according to non-dialectical or conventional theory, as well. We do not reconstruct 
sense through the application of a contrived chronology in the manner of traditional 
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process dialectics. As far as practice goes, a dialectical approach suggests that 
‘traditional’ practices, such as planning and formal organization, do not need to be 
overthrown to reap the benefits of postmodern organization in current competitive 
environments as some gurus claim. On the contrary: plans foster adaptivity and 
flexibility while structure and norms foster creativity and liberation. The nature of 
true genius resides in the ability to hold two contradictory ideas in thought and in 
practice at the same point in time, as one of the most astute observers of the modern 
condition suggested (Fitzgerald, 1968). Excellent management involves no less. 
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Table 1 – Major contributions towards a dialectical view of management 
 Process dialectics  Static dialectics 
‘Total’ 
approaches 
Benson (1975, 1977) 
Goldman & Van Houten (1977) 
 
– 
‘Partial’ 
approaches 
Blau & Scott (1962) 
Chanin & Shapiro (1985) 
Georgiou (1973) 
Greiner (1972) 
Lourenço & Glidewell (1975) 
Mason (1969, 1996) 
Nielsen (1990, 1996) 
Schumpeter (1934) 
 
 
Authors on organizational 
improvisation (for a review see 
Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche 
[1999]) 
Brews & Hunt (1999) 
Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) 
Burrell (1992) 
Camillus (1982) 
Church (1999) 
Edelman & Benning (1998) 
Eisenhardt & Tabrizi (1995) 
Follett (1940a, 1940b) 
Mintzberg & McHugh (1985) 
Mintzberg & Waters (1982) 
Stacey (1991, 1996) 
Weick (1979, 1995) 
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Table 2 – A dialectical approach to strategy. 
Thesis Synthesis Antithesis 
Overarching synthesis 
Strategy is planned Strategy is deliberately 
emergent 
Strategy is emergent 
Elements 
Complying with culture Complying with 
experimental culture 
Experimental culture 
Past helps future success 
(memory as friend) 
Past can be recombined to 
help future success 
(memory as friend and 
foe) 
Past hinders future success 
(memory as foe) 
Skilled / specialized 
individuals and resources 
Skilled individuals with 
genralist resources 
Generalist individuals and 
resources 
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Table 3 – A dialectical approach to organization. 
Thesis Synthesis Antithesis 
Overarching synthesis 
Hierarchy 
(tight organization) 
Minimal structure 
(loosely-tight 
organization) 
Self-managed teams 
(loose organization) 
Elements 
Power/standardization 
(impersonal relationships) 
Trust via standardization 
(impersonal personal 
relationships) 
Trust 
(personal relationships) 
Non-commitment Committed uncommitment Commitment 
Homogeneity (ageeing) Diversified homogeneity 
(agreeing to disagree) 
Diversity (disagreeing) 
Control Control to be free Feedom 
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Table 4 – Contrasting ‘process’ and ‘static’ approaches to management dialectics 
Dialectics as process Dialectics as a state 
Social construction 
- Source of constraint 
- Source of deviation/construction 
 
 
 
Totality 
- Overarching whole 
- Determinants of parts autonomy 
 
 
Contradiction 
- Presence of embedded opposites 
 
 
 
Praxis 
- Process of creative reconstruction of 
social arrangements 
 
Simultaneity 
- Mutual support of opposites 
- Manager as ‘surfacer’ and holder of 
tension 
- Pervasiveness of paradox  
 
Locality 
- Local enactment 
- Action as arena of integration 
- Probability of formalization 
 
Minimality 
- Small causes lead to big effects 
- Quantity: border of necessity 
- Quality: unobtrusiveness 
 
Generality 
- Toleration of opposites 
- Low skill resources 
- Efficient effectiveness 
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